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Abstract 
The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center 
(GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced 
universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and 
affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance 
(CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations.  In 
Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under 
NASA Research Announcements (NRA) 
NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4.  
Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the 
objective to determine the most promising candidate 
technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-
to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze 
their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. 
The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS 
requirements and then develop architectures that 
satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled 
and uncontrolled air space.  This contract is funded 
under NASA’s Aeronautics Research Mission 
Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and 
Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems 
Operations (SASO) project and proposes 
technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic 
Management (UTM) service.   
Communications, Navigation and Surveillance 
(CNS) requirements must be developed in order to 
establish a CNS architecture supporting Unmanned 
Air Systems integration in the National Air Space 
(UAS in the NAS). These requirements must address 
cybersecurity, future communications, satellite-based 
navigation & APNT, and scalable surveillance and 
situational awareness. CNS integration, consolidation 
and miniaturization requirements are also important 
to support the explosive growth in small UAS 
deployment. Air Traffic Management (ATM) must 
also be accommodated to support critical Command 
and Control (C2) for Air Traffic Controllers (ATC). 
This document therefore presents UAS CNS 
requirements that will guide the architecture. 
1. Introduction 
In a companion paper [1], we discuss 
considerations that affect CNS requirements. These 
considerations include UAS classes, UAS Mission 
Classes, UAS demand forecast, etc. Using those 
considerations, this paper addresses requirements for 
communication networks (Layer 3), communication 
datalinks (layer 2), Navigation and Surveillance. 
Within each of these focused areas, requirements are 
based on individual mission needs as well as scaling 
to accommodate large numbers of UAS.  
Requirements for communication networks are 
driven by mission needs for all UAS classes and 
demands. NASA has articulated a vision for an 
Unmanned Air Traffic Management (UTM) system 
[2] that will provide a communication network 
ensuring effective C2 coordination. Small UAS 
operating in uncontrolled airspace will initially be 
controlled by ground pilots who must be reachable 
through on-demand C2 communications from the 
UTM ATC. Ground pilot requirements will diminish 
as greater levels of UAS autonomy are incorporated 
according to regulatory and technical advancements 
to the point that UTM ATC will eventually require 
direct C2 communications with each UAS.  
Similarly, large UAS operating in controlled air 
space must be under active C2 coordination with 
UTM ATC at all times. Communication network 
requirements therefore include a global UTM 
internetwork, global addressing for pervasive UAS 




mobility support, and tactical communications for 
off-nominal conditions. 
Communication datalink requirements include 
range, velocity, latency, availability, integrity, 
security, and bit rate. The pilot may have a direct link 
to UAS when in radio line of sight (RLOS). Beyond 
RLOS, pilots will use cellular or satellite links. We 
concentrate on the bi-directional wireless datalinks 
that connect directly with the UAS. The range refers 
to the transmission distance of the last hop of the 
network to the UAS. For missions operating in the 
controlled airspaces and at airports, the datalinks for 
communication on the ground, take-off, or in flight 
may be different and have different range, velocity 
and latency requirements. 
Regardless of UAS size and mission, all UASs 
require navigation accuracy supporting guidance and 
control within a given airspace (e.g., Class A – G). 
To allow UAS to operate within controlled airspace, 
a certified navigation source will be required on all 
UAS to ensure accuracy of location being reported to 
both UTM and ATM systems. UAS navigating 
within uncontrolled airspace will require at least 
GPS-like accuracy for areas of operation with 
confidence of avoiding terrain and non-cooperative 
objects. UAS will require better than GPS-like 
accuracy when operations need to be closer to the 
terrain, spacing tighter being aerial vehicles, and for 
quicker response to non-cooperative object detection 
and avoidance. Overall, UAS navigation 
requirements are driven by safety of flight and 
mission needs for all classes of airspace operations. 
In terms of surveillance, requirements are focused 
on providing novel systems to fulfill the needs of the 
upcoming UAS paradigm. These requirements will 
be used as a starting point to develop cooperative and 
non-cooperative surveillance systems. They will be 
developed with the objective to overcome the 
limitation of current surveillance systems (accuracy, 
saturation, ability to detect non-cooperative target, 
etc.). These new systems will make use of alternative 
transmission means (using IP-based channels) and of 
modern technologies such as image recognition, or 
radio frequency and noise signatures. 
Requirements for each of the CNS focused areas 
must therefore lead the way to an integrated 
architecture that can accommodate the expected 
demand for integrating UAS into the NAS. These 
requirements must satisfy emerging regulations such 
as the FAA Part 107 amendment for small UAS 
operation [3]. In this paper, we present requirements 
intended to shape CNS technology identification and 
selection. 
2. UAS CNS Requirements 
We organize the UAS CNS system requirements 
according to the four focused areas of 
Communication Networks, Communication Data 
Links, Navigation and Surveillance. Within each of 
these focused areas, requirements are based on 
individual mission needs as well as scaling to 
accommodate large numbers of UAS. The following 
sections present the requirements. 
2.1 Communication Networks 
Requirements for communication networks are 
driven by mission needs for all UAS classes and 
demands. sUAS operating in uncontrolled airspace 
will initially be controlled by ground pilots who must 
be reachable through on-demand C2 communications 
from the UTM Air Traffic Control (ATC). Ground 
pilot requirements will diminish as greater levels of 
sUAS autonomy are incorporated according to 
regulatory and technical advancements to the point 
that UTM ATC will eventually require direct C2 
communications with the sUAS.  Similarly, large 
UAS operating in controlled air space must be under 
active C2 coordination with UTM ATC at all times. 
The UTM global network will connect small and 
large UAS to UTM ATC throughout all flight phases 
and mobility patterns. All UTM correspondents (i.e., 
(s)UAS, ground pilots, ATC stations, etc.) are seen as 
UTM end systems in the global network. The 
following sections present requirements for both 
small and large UAS under all mission conditions: 
REQ CN1: UTM Global Internetwork Service 
A global Internetwork UTM service for UAS 
mission coordination is needed. The UTM service 
will be deployed as an overlay network layered on 
top of the global public Internet and will make 
maximum use of existing Internet infrastructure for 
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cost savings. The UTM service must use Internet 
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [4] and use existing 
Internet access links such as 4G/5G cellular services, 
WiFi hotspots, satellite links, etc. The UTM service 
will be manifested through encapsulation of UTM 
messages within packet headers that can be routed 
across the Internet as shown in Figure 1 below.
 
REQ CN2: Global Addressing 
Each UTM end system will require a global IP 
address or IP subnet prefix that can be used for the 
source and destination addresses of UTM packets. 
These addresses must be uniquely delegated to each 
UTM end system so that communications will 
unambiguously reach the correct destination, i.e., 
much in the same way that our cellphones have a 
unique phone number allocated by our service 
provider. Since the IP version 4 (IPv4) [5] address 
space is depleted, only IPv6 can satisfy this 
requirement. 
REQ CN3: Multilink Support 
The communications network architecture must 
support multiple available data links on each UTM 
end system. The links may have different cost, 
performance, availability and integrity profiles during 
different phases of flight. But, the multilink UTM 
end system must be able to maintain a stable IP 
address or prefix that never changes even if the 
underlying data links change and must be able to 
orchestrate its available data links according to 
current mission requirements. 
REQ CN4: Scalability 
Scalable networks must be able to accommodate 
current load levels and future demand without 
depleting the available IP address pool and without 
overwhelming the network routing system. The UTM 
network must be designed as a scalable global 
network architecture beginning in the United States 
National Air Space (NAS). Small-scale early 
deployments must carry forward to support 
increasingly larger UAS populations. The system 
must also be designed to work in conjunction with 
the ATN/IPS service currently under formulation by 
ICAO for manned aviation [6]. 
REQ CN5: Global Mobility Support 
UTM end systems will naturally travel between 
different data link points of connection during 
missions that extend beyond a single line-of-sight 
connection. Additionally, existing data links may 
become unavailable and new links may come into use 
through various phases of flight. When UTM end 
systems travel, their data link IP addresses may 
change, but their UTM network IP addresses must 
remain stable and unchanging. UTM end systems 
must therefore maintain single, stable IP address or 
prefix as nodes move between access network 
connections. 
Figure 1 - UTM Global Internetwork Service 
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REQ CN6: Small UAS (sUAS) in uncontrolled 
low-altitude airspace 
sUAS will operate in uncontrolled airspace 
between 200-400ft. As sUAS incorporate more and 
more levels of autonomy, the ground pilot role will 
evolve into more of an advisory capacity rather than 
precision flying. There will soon be millions of sUAS 
registered in the US. Each sUAS must therefore 
support C2 communications for both ground pilots 
and UTM ATC for secure and pervasive control. 
REQ CN7: Large UAS in non-segregated 
controlled air space 
Large UAS will initially be under control of ground 
pilots who will coordinate with UTM ATC. As 
greater levels of automation are incorporated, the 
ground pilot’s role will evolve into an advisory 
capacity. Within non-segregated controlled air space, 
however, UTM ATC active involvement will be 
critical for ensuring safe operations in conjunction 
with manned aviation 
REQ CN8: Reliability 
The UTM global network must provide a high 
degree of reliable message delivery. The service 
model for the Internet IP network layer is known as 
“best effort” where each packet is delivered if 
possible, but may be dropped due to unavoidable 
conditions such as link failures or network 
congestion. Since any packet originated from or 
destined to a UAS may contain safety-of-flight 
parameters, this means that the UTM will require 
“better-than-best-effort” reliability at the network 
layer. This can be accomplished through reliable 
network protocols such as the Border Gateway 
Protocol (BGP) [7] and through UAS multi-link 
management. Figure 2 depicts the multi-link 
concept for increased network-layer reliability. 
REQ CN9: Security 
As for all Internet-based communications, cyber-
attacks against the UTM Internetwork and end 
systems themselves could lead to catastrophic 
failures and compromise safety of flight. UTM end 
system hijacking and C2 breaches are mitigated 
through strong end-to-end confidentiality, integrity 
and authentication, but a class of attacks known as 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) poses a serious 
threat for safe UTM operations. The architecture 
must therefore withstand DDoS attacks without 
disruption to UAS communications. 
 
 
Figure 2 - UAS Multilink Operation 
REQ CN10: C2 Messaging 
Command and Control (C2) messaging allows 
ground pilots to control UAS, and allows ATC to 
communicate with ground pilots. sUAS pilots will 
require a more tactical messaging set that supports 
precision flying and near-real time communications. 
At the same time, ATC will require a means of C2 
coordination with ground pilots at first, and then 
evolving to direct ATC C2 communications with 
pilot-less autonomous UAS as greater levels of 
autonomy are incorporated. The pilot-to-UAS tactical 
messaging set should be based on STANAG 4586 [8] 
or proprietary messaging, while ATC-to-pilot 
strategic messaging will use Controller-Pilot Data 
Link Communications (CPDLC) [9]. 
REQ CN11: SA Messaging 
UAS can and do send streaming media content 
such as motion video and acoustic sensor data to 
ground controllers. This need will only increase as 
UAS are used more and more for aerial 
reconnaissance, televised sporting events, and any 
other UAS missions that produce multimedia data. 
The UTM network architecture must therefore 
support high data rate streams of correlated Situation 
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Awareness (SA) messages in addition to the non-
correlated individual messages used for C2 
REQ CN12: Off-Nominal Communications 
Regardless of any communications network or data 
link layer adaptations, UAS will still occasionally 
travel outside of the coverage areas of all available 
communications systems leading to a condition 
known as “lost link”. The UTM communications 
network must therefore observe lost link procedures 
and/or adopt Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking 
(DTN) [10]. 
2.2 Communication Data Links 
Figure 3 shows a simplified architecture of a UAS. 
The pilot controls the UAS and communicates with 
the air traffic control (ATC). The pilot may have a 
direct link to UAS when in radio line of sight 
(RLOS). Beyond RLOS, pilots will use cellular or 
satellite links. All wireless links are shown by dashed 
lines while the solid lines indicate links that are 
generally wired but can also be wireless. The 
capacities of solid datalinks are assumed to be 
sufficiently high to be of any concern. We 
concentrate on the bi-directional wireless datalinks 
that connect directly with the Unmanned Aircraft. 
Thus, the GPS links, which are unidirectional, are not 
included. Also, ground stations to satellite links that 












Figure 3 - Command and Control Data Links 
 
 
REQ DL1: Range 
The range refers to the transmission distance of the 
last hop of the network to the UAS. For example, in 
case, of GEO satellites, this distance is 35,786 km. 
 For Category A and B missions [1] limited 
to visual line of sight, the range of the 
datalink should be at least 5 km. 
 For Category C missions that go beyond 
VLOS, the range of the mission is limited 
by the on-board power. It is expected that 
the UAS can hand-off to the next ground 
transmission station as the signal from the 
previous transmission station decreases 
significantly. This is similar to driving on 
the highway. Therefore, ground-based 
datalinks should support at least 5 km. 
 For Category D1 (UAS stationary in the 
airports), the range of 5 km is required. 
Larger airports may have multiple 
transmission towers to communicate with 
UASs stationed further away. 
 For Category D2 (UASs in Taxi and 
Takeoff), the datalink should be able to 
support a range of 100 nm or 160 km. 
 For Category D3 (UAs in flight), the 
datalink should be able to support a range 
of 1,000 km for ground based transmitter 
and 36000 km for satellite datalinks. 
 For Category D4 (UAs in Oceanic areas), 
the datalink should be able to support 
35,786 km. 
REQ DL2: Velocity 
Speed of the UASs affects the choice of the 
communication datalink technologies. For example, 
WiFi is designed for stationary objects and can work 
for objects moving at a low speed. WiMAX and most 
4G/pre-4G cellular technologies are designed for cars 
moving at 100 km/hr. 
 For Category A and B, the datalink should 
support at least 100 km/hr. 
 For Category C, the datalink should 
support at least 100 km/hr 
 For Category D1 missions, the datalink 
should support at least 100 km/hr. 
 For Category D2 missions, the datalink 
should support a velocity of 1000 km/hr. 
 For Category D3 missions, the datalink 
should support UASs traveling at 1000 
km/hr 
 For Category D4 missions, the datalink 
should support 2000 km/hr. 
(Note that 100 km/hr is equivalent to 28 m/s). 
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REQ DL3: Latency 
The round-trip latency affects how far the UAS can 
deviate from its trajectory. Assuming 10 m is an 
acceptable deviation (allowing 20 m minimum 
distance between sUASs), and 100 m is an acceptable 
deviation for larger UASs traveling at high-speed 
over ground and 200 m for aircrafts above the ocean, 
the latency requirements for all classes is 350 ms. 
REQ DL4: Availability 
The downtime of the link can affect the UAS 
missions. Therefore, it is important to put availability 
requirements. Normally, phone systems have an 
availability requirement of 5 nines (99.999% 
availability). Assuming the same for longer missions 
and assuming slightly less for shorter missions, the 
availability requirements are as follows: 
 For Category A and B mission, the 
datalink availability should be more than 
99.99% 
 For Category C and D missions, the 
datalink availability should be more than 
99.999%. 
 
REQ DL5: Integrity 
Integrity refers to the bit error rate. Bit errors can 
be recovered by various error correction and 
redundant transmission schemes. Wired Ethernet 
based links have an error rate of 10-9 while the 
wireless links have error rates in the vicinity of 10-3. 
These are detected bit error rates which result in 
packet discard. Undetected bit error rates should be 
extremely low since they can result in mission 
failure. 
 The detected bit error rates should be less 
than 10-3 for all missions 
 The undetected bit error rates should be 
less than 10-6 for all missions. 
Note that Category C and D missions will be semi-
autonomous or autonomous. Therefore, they can 
operate with the same level of packet loss as other 
categories. 
REQ DL6: Security 
It is difficult to measure security quantitatively. 
Currently, WiFi with WPA2 security is commonly 
used in all critical ground infrastructures and so we 
require that all UAS datalinks be at least as secure as 
WPA2. In particular, it is required that all messages 
be encrypted. 
REQ DL7: Bit Rate 
Datalink bit rate depends upon the level of 
autonomy. The fully autonomous operation will 
require lower data rates since the UAS does not need 
to wait for instructions from the pilot during flight. 
RTCA white paper [11] provide the an estimate of 
required bit rates as shown in Table 1 and Table 2 for 
uplink and downlink, respectively. 
Table 1. Uplink Bit Rates 
Activity bps 
Telecommand 4,593 
Navigational Aid Setting 666 
ATC Voice 4,800 
ATS Data 49 
Total 10,108 
 
Table 2 - Downlink Bit Rates 
Activity bps 
Telemetry 7,595 
Navaid Display Data 1,137 
ATC Voice 4,800 






Regardless of UAS size and mission, all UASs 
share the need for navigation accuracy supporting 
guidance and control within a given airspace (e.g., 
Class A – G). To allow UAS to operate within 
controlled airspace, a certified navigation source will 
be required on all UAS to ensure accuracy of location 
being reported to both UTM and ATM systems. UAS 
navigating within uncontrolled airspace will require 
at least GPS-like accuracy [12] for areas of operation 
with confidence of avoiding terrain and non-
cooperative objects. UAS will require better than 
GPS-like accuracy when operations need to be closer 
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to the terrain, spacing tighter between aerial vehicles, 
and for quicker response to non-cooperative object 
detection and avoidance. Overall, UAS navigation 
requirements are driven by safety of flight and 
mission needs for all classes of airspace operations 
and will require a multi-source inertial navigation 
system (Figure 4). The following sections present 
requirements for UAS under all mission conditions. 
 
 
Figure 4  - Multi-source Inertial Navigation 
System Architecture 
REQ NV1: GPS Augmentation 
GPS signals alone are extremely weak due to high 
frequency and useless in certain environments, such 
as, low urban and deep canyon operations. To deal 
with GPS-denied condition, an alternate navigation 
system to augment GPS is needed. The following are 
some candidate navigation aiding systems: 
 Vision or image-based navigation system – 
used to determine the position and attitude.  
 Signals of Opportunity Navigation System 
– use of any and all signals for determining a 
navigation solution.  
 Cooperative Navigation System – GPS (and 
GNSSs) like system for obtaining range 
measurements from beacons at known 
locations. 
 Assisted Navigation System – system used 
to significantly improve startup performance 
(i.e., time-to-first-fix (TTFF)) of a GPS 
satellite-based positioning system. 
REQ NV2: Certifiable Navigation Computing 
Architecture 
Safety certification is needed to ensure safety of 
commercial aviation and to ensure safe integration of 
UAS into the NAS. UAS certification challenges 
related to software verification/validation 
requirements to operate in NAS will likely require 
rewriting code due to most existing software was not 
designed to be certifiable. Certification can be 
expensive, time consuming, and risky which can cost 
approximately $100 per each line of code to develop 
and defend artifacts. Therefore, a focus on a cost 
affordable certifiable UAS safety of flight computing 
architecture (Figure 5) to support navigation 
algorithms is desired for implementation on any size 
UAS operating within NAS. 
 
Figure 5  - Cost Effective Certifiable UAS 
Computing Solution 
REQ NV3: Navigation Source Error Detection 
and Correction 
Whether using GPS/GNSS/etc. or RF navigation 
aids the need for error detection and correction is 
required for UAS operating in the NAS. Today, most 
navigation systems do not require error detection and 
correction since these systems are implemented with 
a human in the loop with the ultimate responsibility 
for safety of flight during time of loss of GPS signals. 
GPS signals are susceptible to interference and 
jamming. Civilian GPS signals are unencrypted, 
unauthenticated, and are publicly documented 
making GPS a target for intentional spoofing or 
jamming. In addition, GPS can become unavailable 
in a given geographical area because of Radio 
Frequency Interference (RFI) either non-intentionally 
(i.e., greater noise to signal ratio) or intentionally (i.e. 
spoofing). A spoofing attack is one where a malicious 
transmitter broadcasts a GPS-like signal with the 
intent to deceive GPS users. RFI can be the result of 
unintentional, off-band transmissions by otherwise 
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legitimate radio equipment (e.g., radios, TV 
broadcasts, radars, etc.) or a malicious jammer. 
To detect and correct navigation errors from RF-
based navigation systems (i.e. GPS), it is recommend 
to develop techniques for comparing RF-based 
navigation source calculations to non-RF-based 
navigation source calculation for real-time error 
detection and dynamic switching between navigation 
sources to maintain continuous position accuracy. 
The following is a list of candidate visual sensor 
sources for use on UAS to augment the loss of GPS 
or other regulatory approved RF-based navigation 
aids by means for error detection and correction: 
REQ NV4: Ground Controlled UAS Navigation 
Accuracy 
To properly define UAS navigation accuracy 
requirements for ground controlled UAS operations, 
two conditions have to be managed. First, the 
maneuverability (e.g., speed, rate of turns, climb, 
descent, etc.) profile for UAS has to be defined 
within a given airspace of operation. Secondly, the 
closed loop time has to be defined for worst case. 
Some of the factors impacting closed loop 
communications are: UAS navigation calculation 
processing time; Communication latency between 
UAS and ground station; Ground station command 
and control processing time; Communication latency 
between ground stations and UAS; and, UAS 
processing time to alter flight. 
REQ NV5: Universal Navigation Message Schema 
Up to now UASs are typically formed by a UAV 
and a control station designed to interact with each 
other as a closed system. Type of data-link, 
communication protocol, message format shall 
follow STANAG 4586 messaging schema for UAS 
operations. Next, additional and optimal message 
types need to be defined within STANAG 4586 to 
support exchange of navigation information. 
REQ NV6: BLOS Navigation Accuracy 
UASs have been used for beyond line of sight 
(BLOS) missions, especially for military use, where 
the operative scenario resulted to be very far from the 
control station position, the direct link range has a 
limitation for the UAS control. Then the use of 
satellite communication is utilized for controlling 
UASs. The use of satellite communication for UAS 
control has one major problem which is the time of 
the signals to travel BLOS. Therefore, the need for 
increase autonomous operations helps to reduce the 
latency problem requiring a high available 
navigation solution to be implemented. 
REQ NV7: Autonomous Navigation Accuracy 
Autonomously UAS landing on a stationary pad 
will need sensor capabilities to augment the human in 
a similar scenario of visual landing. Algorithms will 
need to be developed supporting sensor fusion 
framework producing estimates of the UAS state and 
a control system that computes appropriate actuator 
commands. 
2.4 Surveillance  
This section presents a series of surveillance 
requirements to satisfy the needs of novel 
surveillance systems in order to enable UAS 
operations within controlled and uncontrolled 
airspaces. 
REQ SV1: Safety 
It is imperative to develop surveillance systems 
that allow UASs to operate within both controlled 
and uncontrolled airspace without increasing the 
operations level of risk. 
Surveillance systems to be developed shall focus 
on maintaining, and potentially increasing, current 
aeronautical safety criteria. 
Safety analysis of the new systems shall be 
performed to demonstrate that such systems will 
provide the necessary performance in its nominal 
mode of operation. 
REQ SV2: Capacity 
Current surveillance systems such as SSR or 
ADS-B use the 1090MHz frequency band to operate 
[13]. This requirement makes the design and 
integration of new surveillance systems easier. 
However, in environments with high levels of air 
traffic density, the 1090 MHz data link works on 
close to saturation conditions. 
The capacity of new surveillance systems shall 
be dimensioned to overcome the limitations of 
current systems. Instead of the 1090 MHz frequency, 
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surveillance systems shall rely on alternative 
datalinks and networks. 
REQ SV3: Efficiency 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is evolving 
worldwide towards a more efficient way of flying 
with less emissions and more capacity for the airports 
and the airspace. This implies new procedures and 
new Communications, Navigations and Surveillance 
(CNS) technologies. Such technologies will 
modernize the current ATM scenario, but they will 
also represent opportunities for new security threats. 
Surveillance systems to be developed shall 
contribute to fulfill the efficiency needs of the 
increasing air traffic density and complexity. 
Especially challenging in terms of improving the 
ATM efficiency with an increase on the traffic 
operations as the one expected with the integration of 
UAS operations are those areas close to airports. 
Surveillance systems to be developed shall also 
be designed with the objective of having an efficient 
performance. The principle of best effort shall be 
applied in order to minimize the use of the available 
bandwidth and the impact over the communication 
network underlying the surveillance applications. 
REQ SV4: Security 
Legacy surveillance systems were designed with 
a functional dimension but not with a security one. 
They present very few or no security measures. The 
information managed by current surveillance systems 
is accessible to anyone having a receiver without any 
special restriction. The easy accessibility to such 
relevant data may facilitate exploitation by interested 
adversaries for disturbing and attacking indistinctly 
specific flights or the complete traffic within an 
airspace sector. 
Main vulnerabilities of the CNS/ATM system 
can be categorized in three groups according to their 
impact: 
 Spoofing or injection of fake flight 
information or fake ATC directives using a 
dedicated emitter. 
 Jamming or interference of some of the 
aeronautical frequencies used for 
surveillance. 
 Cyber-attacks, including the installation of 
malicious software (malware) in the 
ground-based infrastructure or in the 
onboard systems that might affect the 
adequate progress of a flight. 
Security shall be one of the premises for the 
surveillance systems to be developed. They shall be 
defined and developed under the premise of security 
by design. 
REQ SV5: Integration 
Two levels of integration shall be considered in 
the development of the surveillance systems: 
 Surveillance systems for UAS operating 
within controlled airspace – Controlled 
airspace is regulated according to a series 
of requirements defined in terms of 
altitude, proximity to airports, ATC 
clearances, avionics, instrumental flight 
rules and visual flight rules. All these 
requirements are mandatory for any 
vehicle flying within controlled airspace. 
Due to the conservative nature of this 
scenario, probably a pragmatic solution 
might be the best approach.  
 Integration of surveillance systems for 
both controlled and uncontrolled airspace 
– Uncontrolled airspace allows more 
creative, complex and novel surveillance 
systems. However the systems for this 
scenario shall be developed in such a way 
that a transition of their features to the 
controlled airspace scenario is possible. 
The surveillance systems developed for 
uncontrolled airspace shall enable a 
progressive transition of the solutions to a 
controlled airspace scenario. 
 
REQ SV6: Dependent Cooperative Surveillance  
Dependent cooperative systems present great 
benefits compared to those non-cooperative. ADS-B 
is the main current surveillance dependent 
cooperative system. However, ADS-B features make 
it not valid for the UAS integration purposes.  
Automated cooperative surveillance systems 
shall be developed in order to include ADS-B 
benefits, while improve its capabilities and 
overcoming its vulnerabilities. 
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REQ SV7: Non-cooperative Surveillance 
Current non-cooperative surveillance systems do 
not provide the required features for an efficient 
UTM.  Thus, the development of new non-
cooperative surveillance systems is required to be 
able to cope with the features of the upcoming UAS 
paradigm. 
Non-cooperative surveillance systems for UAS 
pose a big challenge. In order to develop such 
systems different technologies shall be investigated 
(i.e. image recognition systems, noise and RF 
signature detection). 
REQ SV8: Surveillance data flows 
Surveillance data shall be interchanged between 
different actors (UASs, commercial aircraft, ATCs, 
AOCs, etc.). While some of them might only receive 
data, others will not only receive but also transmit 
surveillance data. Different data flows will be taken 
into account for the surveillance systems design and 
development. 
 Air-to-ground: An air-to-ground (and 
ground-to-air) surveillance data flow will 
be established between UASs and the 
systems on the ground. UASs when using 
dependent surveillance systems will 
determine their own position and transmit 
it to the ground. In order to transmit these 
data, different data-links might be used 
(3G/4G, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, Satellite, 1090 
MHz, UAT, etc.). 
 Air-to-air: Some surveillance data will be 
transmitted directly between UASs or 
between airplanes and UASs. “ADS-B In” 
applications receive data from the 
surrounding aircraft broadcasting ADS-B 
messages. Communications shall be 
established between near UASs in order to 
interchange surveillance data. Hence, the 
air-to-air sector shall be considered when 
defining systems and architectures to 
enable the integration of UASs’ operation 
within controlled and uncontrolled 
airspaces. 
 Ground-to-ground: The ground-to-ground 
sector shall also be taken into account as 
there shall be different scenarios where 
surveillance systems on the ground might 
need to interchange surveillance data. This 
will be the case of the integration of 
surveillance systems for controlled 
airspace. Another scenario might be that 
where two or more systems on the ground 
need to share surveillance data from 
overlapping areas of service as shown in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6  - Overlapping areas of service 
 
REQ SV9: Performance 
Surveillance systems to be developed shall be 
designed to provide for a continuously updated 
presentation of surveillance information, including 
position indications. New surveillance systems shall 
be developed in order to enable such integration. 
The set of parameters and associated definitions 
that shall be used to define the proposed surveillance 
systems shall include: Data item (the information 
(e.g., position, identity and intent) that the 
surveillance system is required to deliver), accuracy, 
availability, integrity, latency, update period, 
continuity, coverage, and reliability. 
3. Summary 
The requirements identified in this document are 
intended to provide guidance for the development of 
a CNS architecture for all classes of UAS operating 
in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. 
Accordingly, UAS CNS architecture studies will be 
conducted under the continued investigations of the 
NASA SASO program. We further see the UTM 
concept as a foundational principle for the 
formulation of new CNS architectures. In our future 
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work, we will explore synergies between the UTM 
concept for UAS CNS and the emerging CNS 
solutions under consideration for manned aviation. A 
harmonized architecture will be necessary to allow 
for effective Air Traffic Management of all aerial 
vehicles to assure safe and secure integrated 
operations.  
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